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and	the	United	States—as	well	as	the	United	
Nations	 Development	 Programme,	 the	
required	 funding	 for	 the	 project	 has	 been	
raised.	The	Azerbaijan	National	Agency	or	
Mine	 Action	 UXO	 team,	 with	 a	 capacity	
of	 11	 UXO	 operators,	 launched	 the	 proj-
ect	 13	December	 2005.	 ANAMA	 instruc-
tors	 joined	 with	 United	 States	 European	
Command	 (USEUCOM)	 specialists	 to	
train	 an	 additional	 36	UXO	 operators	 for	
the	 same	 project	 at	 ANAMA’s	 Regional	
Office	 in	 Khanlar	 (UXO	 team	 capacity	
within	ANAMA	was	created	with	the	sup-
port	of	USEUCOM	in	2002).
Abandoned ammunition storage clear-
ance. In	 describing	 the	 problem	 of	 ERW,	
the	threat	of	abandoned	ammunition	is	also	
significant.	When	 researching	 information	
on	 the	 subject	 of	 abandoned	 ammunition,	
cases	can	be	found	in	Nigeria,	Albania	and	
Kuwait,	 but	 thus	 far	minimal	 information	
describing	 Azerbaijan’s	 abandoned	 ammu-
nition	problem	is	available.	The	Soviet	ware-
house	in	Agstafa	can	provide	an	additional	
case	 for	better	understanding	 the	 threat	of	
abandoned	ammunition	and	the	challenges	
that	 groups	 like	ANAMA	 face	 in	 order	 to	
clear	this	type	of	ERW.
The	task	for	abandoned	Soviet	munition	
storage	clearance	in	Agstafa	is	very	compli-
cated	and	dangerous	for	several	reasons:
•	 The	 occurrence	 of	 “ammunition	
spreads”	 in	which	 different	 types	 of	
ammunition	are	mixed	and	scattered	
throughout	the	area	
•	 The	 presence	 of	 degraded	 flechette 
and	 fragmentation	 ammunition,	
which	consist	of	small	projectile	darts	
and	shrapnel	that	are	hazardous	and	
not	immediately	identifiable
•	 The	 presence	 of	 white	 phosphorus,	
which	ignites	when	exposed	to	air
•	 Incorrect	 or	 misleading	 marking	
of	UXO	
Taking	 into	 account	 that	 15	 years	 have	
passed	since	the	warehouse	explosion,	clear-
ance	of	this	ammunition	is	a	complicated—
yet	extremely	important—task.	
In	 addition	 to	 planned	 clearance	 proj-
ects	 such	 as	 these	 mentioned,	 ANAMA	
also	provides	rapid	response	to	mine/UXO-	
related	 emergencies.	 When	 one	 Agstafa	
scrap-metal	 workshop	 set	 up	 by	 locals	
exploded	 approximately	 200	 metres	 (219	
yards)	from	a	residential	area,	the	workshop	
itself	 was	 totally	 destroyed	 and,	 according	
to	 official	 information	 by	 local	 authorities,	
three	 people	 were	 killed	 and	 23	 injured.	
Additionally,	the	explosion	damaged	houses	
as	 far	 as	 three	kilometres	 (two	miles)	 from	
the	 workshop.	 Immediately	 following	 the	
explosion,	 ANAMA	 established	 a	 team	 of	
UXO	 operators	 to	 carry	 out	 emergency	
marking	 and	 clearance	 operations	 in	 the	
incident	 area.	 Operations	 lasted	 for	 one	
month	and	as	a	result,	170,000	square	me-
tres	 (42	 acres)	 of	 land	 were	 cleared	 and	
more	 than	 5,007	 items	 of	 UXO	 (among	
them	 1,261	 pieces	 containing	 white	 phos-
phorous)	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 area	
and	 destroyed.	 ANAMA	 has	 continued	
to	 react	 quickly	 to	 any	 mine-	 and	 UXO-	
related	emergencies.
Conclusion
As	 the	 Japanese	 might	 say,	 “Tada yori 
takai mono wa nai” (“We	have	to	pay	much	
more	for	something	we	got	free	of	charge”).	
It	is	important	to	figure	out	how	to	solve	the	
existing	 problem	 of	 UXO	 and	 abandoned	
ammunition	 and	 how	 to	 protect	 ourselves	
from	 ERW	 in	 the	 future.	 Human	 beings	
created	 the	 problem—dropping	 the	 bombs	
and	abandoning	the	ammunition	“for	free”	
on	Azerbaijan—and	now	they	must	correct	
it	 at	 great	 cost	 by	 cleaning	up	 the	 country	
and	making	it	safe	again.
See Endnotes, page 109
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F ollowing	a	conflict,	humanitarian	organisations	are	generally	the	first	to	enter	a	country	to	deliver	aid	and	start	to	rebuild	the	country’s	infrastructure.	Aid	workers	often	rely	on	a	4x4	
sport-utility	 vehicle	 to	 transport	 supplies	 and	people.	This	 type	 of	
carrier	is	viewed	as	a	big,	strong	vehicle	with	high	mobility,	but	it	of-
fers	little	protection	against	landmines	and	other	explosive	remnants	
of	war.	It	is	what	is	known	as	a	“soft	vehicle.”
The	 term	ERW	 is	 very	 wide	 and	 covers	 anything	 from	 handgun	
ammunition	to	aircraft	bombs.1	The	majority	of	injuries,	however,	are	
caused	by	devices	like	anti-personnel	landmines,	anti-tank	mines	and,	as	
seen	recently	in	Lebanon,	air-dropped	submunition	“bomblets.”	Apart	
from	being	the	most	numerous,	AP	mines	are	directed	against	people	
on	foot	and	are	normally	designed	to	explode	following	a	relatively	small	
impact—often	by	the	pressure	of	a	foot	or	the	tripping	of	a	wire.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 small-	 or	 large-calibre	 gun	 ammunition,	 air-
craft	 bombs	 and	mortar	 rounds	 tend	 to	be	more	 stable—although	
when	they	do	explode,	the	results	can	be	much	more	devastating.	
The author discusses the challenges of protecting aid workers riding in 
traditional unarmoured vehicles from the dangers of explosive remnants of 
war. He offers some practical, after-market solutions that provide a high level 
of protection for much less than the cost of traditional armoured vehicles.
Protection of Soft Vehicles 
Against ERW
by	Thomas	Hvidtfeldt	[	Scanfiber	Composites	A/S	]
The	 extent	 to	 which	 AP	mines	 endanger	 passengers	 in	 a	 soft-
skinned	 SUV	 depends	 heavily	 upon	 which	 type	 of	 device	 we’re	
talking	about.	We	can	separate	the	various	devices	into	two	groups	
depending	on	their	primary	kill	mechanism:
•	 Blast ammunition	works	by	 creating	 a	powerful	blast	wave	
that	destroys	objects	in	close	proximity	to	the	explosion.
•	 Fragmenting ammunition	works	by	creating	a	cloud	of	high-
velocity	steel	fragments	intended	to	inflict	as	much	damage	as	
possible	to	anything	or	anyone	in	the	surrounding	area.
Most	AP	mines	 inflict	 injury	primarily	 through	 the	blast	effect	
and	normally	detonate	by	pressure.	The	effect	 from	the	blast	wave	
decreases	rapidly	with	distance	and	it	 is	often	a	“one	kill”	weapon.	
On	the	other	hand,	some	AP	mines	and	many	types	of	air-dropped	
bomblets	work	with	 fragmentation	as	 the	primary	kill	mechanism.	
The	same	goes	for	almost	all	mortar	rounds	and	artillery	ammuni-
tion.	Contrary	to	a	blast	wave,	which	loses	its	power	very	quickly,	
the	 high-density	 fragments	 surrounding	 the	 explosives	 maintain	
Effect	from	fragmenting	mine	on	a	vehicle.	Here	a	car’s	steel-plate	body	was	ruptured	by	fragments	
from	a	small	hand	grenade.	
ALL	PHOTOS	COURTESY	OF	THOMAS	HVIDTFELDT
Side	Protection	and	Seat	Protection	is	one	product	that	offers	protection	from	roadside	bombs.
Death Valley Challenge to Raise $100K 
Mines Advisory Group, in partnership with CEIA USA, will sponsor a 423-kilometre (263-mile) 
bike trek across Death Valley, USA. Event organizers hope to raise nearly £40,000 (US$74,000) 
to support mine-action efforts around the globe. 
From 4–11 March 2007, 40 participants will travel and cycle to raise money and awareness. The 
registration fee for the event is only £175 ($325), but each participant is asked to raise 
£2,750 ($5,100) in sponsorships, half of which will cover the cost of running the event. 
Included in trek costs are London-to-Las Vegas airfare, accommodations, nearly all meals, 
the use of bicycles and other sundry expenses.
For more information on this trip, visit www.magclearsmines.org.
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their	 energy	 for	 much	 longer	
and	can	 inflict	 injury	quite	 far	
away	from	the	explosion.	Due	
to	 this	 extended	 range,	 most	
types	 of	 fragmenting	 AP	
mines	have	the	option	of	trip-
wire	detonation,	which	enables	
the	mine	to	go	off	when	a	per-
son	or	vehicle	trips	a	wire	up	to	
10	metres	(33	feet)	away.	
A	person	is	at	risk	in	two	dif-
ferent	 ways	 while	 travelling	 in	
an	SUV.	 If	 the	vehicle	detonates	
an	AP	 device	 that	works	 primar-
ily	through	blast,	the	distance	from	
the	 expected	 impact	 point	 (below	
a	 wheel)	 to	 the	 person	 in	 the	 vehicle	
is	normally	high	enough	to	create	a	 safe	
distance.	 However,	 if	 the	 device	 creates	
fragments,	 the	 thin	 steel	 of	 the	 car	 body	
will	 offer	 almost	no	protection	 against	 the	
high-velocity	steel	fragments.	The	standard	
car-body	steel	is	0.8	millimetre	(0.03	inch)	
thick	 and	will	 not	prevent	 fragments	 from	
entering	into	the	cabin.
To	express	 it	 another	way,	when	we	are	
talking	about	various	AP	devices,	the	main	
concern	 for	passengers	 in	 a	 vehicle	 is	 frag-
mentation	rather	than	the	shock	or	blast	ef-
fect	from	the	explosive.	
For	that	reason,	in	an	area	with	a	high	
risk	of	setting	off	fragmenting	AP	ammu-
nition,	 fully	 armoured	 SUVs	 are	 recom-
mended.	However,	apart	 from	being	very	
costly,	 excessively	 heavy	 and	 hard	 to	 ob-
tain	in	sufficient	numbers,	fully	armoured	
SUVs	 tend	 to	 give	 the	wrong	 impression	
of	 the	 humanitarian	 workers—namely	
that	they	are	not	willing	to	take	the	same	
risks	 that	 the	 inhabitants	must	 take	on	a	
daily	basis.
As	an	alternative	to	fully	armoured	vehi-
cles,	there	are	a	number	of	retrofit	solutions	
on	the	market	today	that	can	provide	a	good	
level	of	protection	 for	passengers	 travelling	
in	 soft-skinned	 vehicles.	Although	 retrofit-
ted	vehicles	do	not	provide	the	same	level	of	
protection	as	factory-armoured	SUVs,	some	
can	work	well	against	a	large	number	of	ERW	
threats	for	about	one-twentieth	the	price	of	
a	 fully	 armoured	 vehicle.	 Consequently,	 a	
much	higher	number	of	vehicles—and	thus	
passengers—can	be	protected	 for	 the	 same	
money.	In	addition,	the	retrofit	solutions	to	
protect	 soft	 vehicles,	 like	 ballistic	 blankets	
(described	below),	can	be	delivered	quickly	
and	most	can	be	installed	in	the	field.
Built-in Ballistic Blankets
Most	 retrofit	 solutions	 to	 protect	
SUVs	are	based	on	aramide	 fabric,	 such	as	
Twaron®	or	Kevlar®,	which	is	the	ballistic	
material	used	in	most	body	armour.	By	us-
ing	flexible	 armour,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 design	
solutions	that	fit	into	the	curved	interior	and	
floor	of	the	SUV.
In	 terms	 of	 level	 of	 protection,	 flex-
ible	solutions	using	aramide	on	the	interior	
and	floor	 of	 the	 vehicle	 generally	 represent	
a	lower	level	of	protection	than	those	found	
on	 the	 sides	 of	 a	 factory-armoured	 SUV.	
Ballistic	blankets	 are	 available	 from	several	
sources	 and	 are	 a	 system	 of	 tailor-cut	 and	
overlapping	blankets	 that	cover	as	much	of	
the	 interior	of	 the	vehicle	 as	possible	up	 to	
the	windows.3	
Ballistic	 blankets	 offer	 a	 good	 level	 of	
protection	against	 fragments	coming	from	
below	or	from	the	lower	sides.	They	are	in-
stalled	below	the	carpet	and	inside	the	side	
panels	 and	 doors	 and	 require	 a	 complete	
stripping	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 After	 reinstalla-
tion,	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 vehicle	 looks	 the	
same	 as	 before,	 with	 no	 visible	 signs	 of	 it	
being	protected.
The	 protection	 level	 of	 the	 blankets	 is	
normally	 specified	 according	 to	 a	 North	
Atlantic	 Treaty	 Organization	 standard	
STANAG	 [Standardisation	 Agreement]	
29202	and	 the	 standard	 level	by	most	non-
governmental	organizations	is	a	level	referred	
to	as	600	m/sec.	It	is	not	possible	to	connect	
this	 level	 directly	 to	 any	 specific	 mine	 or	
grenade	 as	 the	 actual	 conditions	 have	 an	
enormous	 influence	 on	 the	 real	 threat.	
However,	 a	 level	 of	 600	 m/sec	 can	 be	 di-
rectly	 compared	 to	 other	means	 of	 protec-
tion;	 for	 instance,	 standard	 body	 armour	
(without	vest-insert	plates)	represents	a	level	
of	protection	of	450	m/sec	and	contains	only	
about	half	the	amount	of	ballistic	material.	
A	passenger	in	a	vehicle	that	hits	fragment-
ing	ERW	is	much	better	off	if	the	vehicle	is	
equipped	with	 ballistic	 blankets	 than	 if	 he	
is	 wearing	 body	 armour;	 in	 addition	 to	 a	
higher	 ballistic	 level,	 the	 ballistic	 blankets	
will	 offer	protection	of	 the	 extremities	 and	
not	only	the	torso.	
Interestingly,	 compared	 to	 a	 fully	 ar-
moured	 SUV,3	 many	 soft-skinned	 vehicles	
equipped	 with	 ballistic	 blankets	 are	 better	
protected	 against	 landmines	 detonating	 on	
the	ground.	The	reason	for	this	seeming	in-
consistency	is	because	most	armoured	SUVs	
are	designed	with	a	level	of	floor	protection	
according	 to	 an	 old	 German	 standard	 for	
armoured	 limousines	 known	 as	 the	 “two	
hand	 grenades”	 level.	 Unfortunately,	 the	
specified	 grenade—the	 German	 type	
DM51—is	quite	small	and	contains	relative-
ly	small	fragments	that	are	easily	stopped.	
In	addition	to	blankets,	various	systems	
exist	on	the	market	to	shield	the	passengers	
from	fragments.	
New	 technologies	 with	 in-the-field	 ar-
mouring	options	can	be	fitted	and	removed	
when	 there	 is	 no	 immediate	 danger.	 This	
type	of	protection	is	designed	to	provide	an	
increased	 level	of	protection	against	ERW	
and	 other	 weapons	 that	 explode	 next	 to	
the	 vehicles.	 The	 increased	 availability	 of	
these	options	improves	the	safety	potential	
for	vehicles	working	in	proximity	to	ERW.	
In	turn,	these	options	and	those	developed	
and	 implemented	 in	 the	 future	 will	 con-
tinue	 to	 better	 the	 working	 conditions	 of	
personnel	exposed	to	such	risks.
See Endnotes, page 109
Thomas Hvidtfeldt	is	the	Sales	
Manager	for	Scanfiber	Composites		
A/S	where	he	has	been	since	2002.
Thomas	Hvidtfeldt
Sales	Manager
Scanfiber	Composites	A/S
Niels	Bohrs	Vej	11	
DK	9870	Sindal	/	Denmark	
Tel:	+45	98	93	44	33
Fax:	+45	98	93	45	44
E-mail:	th@scanfiber.dk
Web	site:	http://www.scanfiber.dk
Ballistic	blankets.
W orldwide,	 landmines	 and	 unexploded	ordnance	 kill	 and	 maim	 approximately	20,000	 people	 annually,	 one	 third	 of	
them	children.3	
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 international	 community	 has	
not	paid	serious	attention	to	the	risk	posed	by	the	UXO	
problem	 (i.e.,	 explosive	 ordnance	 that	 is	 used	 during	
armed	conflict	but	fails	to	detonate).	It	is	impossible	to	
accurately	count	the	number	of	uncleared	mines	and	it	
is	also	uncertain	how	much	UXO	remains.	However,	it	
is	believed	the	total	number	of	items	of	UXO,	no	mat-
ter	the	type,	greatly	exceed	the	total	number	of	mines.	
UXO	and	other	explosive	items	such	as	abandoned	ord-
nance	 (all	 grouped	 together	 under	 the	 term	 explosive 
remnants of war)	continue	to	appear	in	huge	numbers	in	
previous	areas	of	conflict.	Some	countries,	like	Laos	and	
Vietnam,	are	more	affected	by	UXO	than	mines.	
Nowadays	 the	 international	 community	 is	 paying	
more	 serious	 attention	 to	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	 the	UXO	
problem.	This	is	reaffirmed	by	the	adoption	of	Protocol	
V	to	the	Convention	on	Certain	Conventional	Weapons.	
The	adoption	of	Protocol	V	on	28	November	2003	was	
possible	thanks	to	governments	acknowledging	the	seri-
ousness	of	the	post-conflict	problems	posed	by	UXO	as	
well	as	the	necessity	to	minimize	the	risk	and	impact	of	
UXO.	 Tajikistan	 ratified	 Protocol	 V	 on	 20	 December	
2005,	and	the	Protocol	entered	into	force	for	all	parties	on	
12	November	2006.	In	accordance	with	the	Protocol,	the	
term	ERW	encompasses	UXO	and	abandoned	explosive	
ordnance	in	conflict	areas.	This	Protocol	obliges	the	con-
flicting	parties,	as	well	as	States	Parties,	to	be	responsible	
Explosive Remnants of War and 
Their Consequences
by	Jonmahmad	Rajabov	[	Tajikistan	Mine	Action	Centre	]
This article examines the post-conflict situation of Tajikistan, which has not only anti-personnel 
mines but various kinds of explosive remnants of war. Recently Tajikistan signed Protocol V1 
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,2 
which includes a commitment to clear the nation’s ERW. 
The author highlights some of the different sources of 
ERW in Tajikistan as well as the progress being made by 
authorities to clear and destroy ERW. 
with	regard	to	all	UXO	under	their	control.	Tajikistan	also	has	a	landmine	problem	
and	has	ratified	the	Ottawa	Convention.4	Together,	these	two	documents	stipulate	
that	after	active	military	fighting	ceases,	countries	should	mark	and	clear	the	mines	
as	well	as	liquidate	and	destroy	all	mines	and	UXO	under	their	control.	
Impact of ERW in Tajikistan
In	addition	to	the	landmine	problem,	items	of	UXO	also	pose	a	great	challenge	
in	Tajikistan.	It	is	presumed	that	most	ERW	remains	in	the	country	due	to	the	
civil	war	(1992–1997).	The	UXO	in	Tajikistan	that	remains	on	the	ground	is	the	
result	of	being	fired	 from	military	planes	and	helicopters,	as	well	as	 shelling.	A	
large	number	of	Tajik	citizens	have	consequently	died	or	been	seriously	injured.	
It	is	necessary	to	note	that	items	of	UXO	also	appear	in	the	country	for	reasons	
unrelated	to	war,	including	armed	violence	and	attempted	revolts.	In	Tajikistan,	
as	 in	many	other	 countries,	mandatory	military	 service	 requires	 continued	and	
regular	military	training	for	the	Armed	Forces.	It	has	been	the	case	in	Tajikistan	
that	during	training,	some	shells	have	been	fired	and	accidentally	landed	outside	
the	military	training	zone.	These	shells	remain	unexploded	in	areas	where	access	
to	the	public	remains	open,	putting	the	local	population	at	risk.
Since	the	implementation	of	the	Tajikistan	Mine	Action	Programme,	the	man-
ual	mine-clearance	teams	and	survey	teams	have	found	and	destroyed	more	than	
700	pieces	of	UXO.	A	majority	of	the	ERW	were	found	in	the	central	region	of	
the	country	where	fighting	took	place	during	the	civil	war.	Until	the	ERW	are	re-
moved	from	these	areas,	they	will	continue	to	pose	a	great	risk	to	the	population.
In	Tajikistan,	despite	the	ERW	problem,	civilians	go	about	their	daily	business	
and	continue	 to	find	themselves	 in	dangerous	areas,	at	 times	 receiving	 injuries.	
For	example,	in	February	2006,	two	teenagers—brother	N.	Yorov,	15,	and	sister	
M.	Yorova,	16,	from	Besimas	village	in	Hissor	district—were	injured	by	a	UXO	
explosion	while	cutting	wood.	N.	Yorov’s	leg	was	seriously	injured	and	his	sister	
received	injuries	to	her	stomach.	Due	to	the	lack	of	financial	means,	the	family	
was	unable	to	provide	necessary	medical	care	for	the	teenagers,	which	has	greatly	
hampered	their	recovery.	An	investigation	into	the	cause	of	this	explosion	revealed	
A	group	of	houses	in	close	proximity	to	a	mine	danger	zone.	
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